Abstract: Classical Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) can determine the effects of combinations of failure events on a system but cannot capture the potentially critical significance of the temporal ordering of events. In this paper, we propose a temporal extension based on the use of Priority-AND gates to allow relative temporal ordering and temporal analysis in FTA. The classical notion of minimal cut-sets is replaced with the notion of minimal cutsequences and a methodology is proposed for qualitative analysis. The approach is demonstrated on a generic two stage standby recovery system. The paper tentatively concludes that this type of temporal FTA can provide a more precise and ultimately more correct insight into the failure behaviour of a system.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a classical safety and reliability analysis technique which is widely used in the automotive, aerospace, nuclear, and other safety critical industries. Although FTA is a well established technique, it is primarily a manual one, and the process of performing the analysis can be laborious, especially for large and complex systems. This means that FTA tends to be performed only once the design has been finalised in order to predict its reliability. This is unfortunate, because FTA is potentially even more useful when integrated into the design process itself, so that a system can be designed with safety and reliability in mind. By using FTA as part of an iterative design process, it would be possible to identify and remedy potential flaws much earlier, thereby saving both time and effort and producing a more reliable product.
However, before FTA can be incorporated into the design process, it needs to be automated in some fashion, so that it can be carried out more efficiently. HiP-HOPS (Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies) is a new technique for the semi-automatic construction of fault trees and FMEAs (Papadopoulos, et al., 2001) intended to achieve such a goal. By including failure annotations as part of the system model, HiP-HOPS can then examine the model and automatically construct and analyse both fault trees and FMEAs. The result is a semi-automated process which takes much of the burden off the system designer and speeds up the analysis considerably, allowing the designer to quickly identify weak points in the model and take steps to remedy them. However, HiP-HOPS only produces standard combinatorial fault trees, and over the years it has become apparent that normal FTA struggles to analyse systems in which time plays an important part. Such systems include those with redundant standby components or multiple modes of operation, and systems in which events must occur in certain sequences to cause a fault. In such cases, the analysis usually either involves multiple fault trees to account for each state, or enclosing the temporal constraints within the event descriptions themselves. The first leads to complex, fragmented analyses and the second effectively hides important temporal relationships, neither of which is really satisfactory.
The original solution to this problem was most likely the Priority-AND (or 'PAND') gate (Vesely, et al, 1981) , which would evaluate to true only if all of its inputs occurred in a specific order, usually from left to right. However, despite work on quantitative analysis for the PAND gate (Fussel, et al, 1976) , it was never rigorously defined, and when it is used in qualitative analysis it tends to be treated as an AND gate rather than a unique logical gate. In more recent times, though, there have been several other attempts to remedy this temporal deficiency in FTA. One of the most prominent is the development of the Dynamic Fault Tree (DFT) methodology (Sullivan, et al, 1999) . Its goal is to enable analysis of systems with certain dynamic interrelationships between events, including functional dependencies and standby components. Other approaches include the proposal of a complete set of temporal fault tree (TFT) gates by Palshikar (2002) , and a rigorously defined generic temporal And-Then (TAND) gate by Wijayarathna and Maekawa (2000) .
Whilst each of these various solutions has advantages, each also has disadvantages. DFTs, perhaps the most established of the different approaches, is both quite specific in its intent to model dependencies and redundant components and also lacks a clear method for performing qualitative analysis; TFTs, whilst more general in application and providing for qualitative analysis, are quite complex and introduce many new gates to the fault tree; lastly, though the TAND gate is designed to be both flexible and generic in application, it is somewhat limited by its strict definition. FTA is meant to be easy to apply and designed to allow for qualitative conclusions to be reached as well as quantitative calculations. Burdening the fault tree structure with too many new gates or limiting its application too far begins to go against the original philosophy that makes FTA popular.
In this paper, we look at a different approach that employs a redefinition of the original longestablished Priority-AND gate to represent the temporal information in a fault tree, and a new way of qualitatively analysing this information using a novel technique called 'doublet analysis'. The intent behind this work is to provide a simple yet flexible method for performing qualitative analysis on temporal fault trees.
In section 2 we discuss the redefinition of the PAND gate, and in section 3 we discuss the temporal logic it is intended to represent and the ways it can be reduced. In section 4, we present an example to show how the reduction algorithms are employed, and explain the results. Finally, in section 5, we draw conclusions and end by outlining further work.
PAND GATES
The Priority-AND (PAND) gate is one of the more obscure types of gate available to the fault tree analyst. The PAND gate is unique amongst the standard gates because by enforcing an order upon a set of events, it allows a fault tree to express timedependent structures. This provides a means of introducing time-based information into fault trees, and therefore allowing the sequence of events to be taken into account. PANDs are one of the simplest ways of representing the temporal aspect of failures, and have been part of the fault tree toolbox for decades; the problem with the PAND gate, however, is that it was never thoroughly defined, meaning it is difficult to use it in qualitative analysis. Many cut set analysis algorithms, such as SETS (Worrell and Stack, 1978) , simply treat the PAND gate as a normal AND gate for the purposes of logical reduction. It is often argued that the replacement of a PAND by an AND simply leads only to a conservative prediction of the failure behaviour of the system, but this claim is not necessarily true. Consider the simple example of a standby recovery system in Normally the system performs its function using component A. A is monitored by a switch which starts standby component B when there is an omission of output from A. In a classical fault tree, the following expression relates the top event to logical combinations of causes:
However, the above is not only pessimistic in quantitative terms, but it is also logically wrong: the system does not fail if the switch fails after A. We need to be able to specify the order of events more precisely, in order to be able to distinguish between sequences that cause failure and sequences that do not: Much depends on our definition of time. The TAND gate was specifically designed to try to address this issue of ambiguity and represents Allen's 'meets' relation -the TAND gate is true if its second input occurs immediately after its first input ends. It was intended as a building block to represent any temporal relation, independent of any one model of time, but in fact the TAND only works within a representation of time in which events have a duration and a clearly defined start and end point. The problem is that such precise specification of events, especially failure events, is often very difficult in fault trees, and this restricts the applicability of the TAND gate. There is normally no notion of events having a 'duration' in FTA. The Fault Tree Handbook (Vesely, et al, 1981) says that, "Under conditions of no repair, a fault that occurs will continue to exist. … From the standpoint of constructing a fault tree, we need concern ourselves only with the phenomenon of occurrence." The TAND approach, which uses Allen's 13 temporal relations, does not correspond readily to this system. Because its events must have a duration, it tacitly assumes the events represent the existence of a fault rather than the occurrence of a fault, and does not properly take into account what the negation of an event actually means.
What is needed, we believe, is a temporal gate that is not restricted in such a way, one that can work with a representation of time in which only the relative order of event occurrence is important, yet still be sufficiently well-defined to enable it to be analysed appropriately. At its core, this is exactly what the Priority-AND gate was intended to do: indicate whether one event occurred before another, so that it could impose a sequence on a set of events. By taking this original purpose and focusing it, it is possible to transform the original, ambiguous PAND gate into a more effective temporal gate. One thing that all representations of time have in common is that it must be possible to determine whether one moment in time is the same as another moment in time. If not, then one or the other must come first. If this fundamental definition is applied it to the Priority-AND gate, we avoid the problems inherent in becoming bound to a specific model of time or events. Instead, we define the PAND gate so it is only true if its first input occurs any time before its second input. If we then have another gate, which is a temporal version of the classical AND gate that represents the situation where two moments in time are the same, then all possible situations for two events, A and B, can be represented:
A is after B
We create a new AND gate, dubbed a Simultaneous-AND (SAND) gate, to represent situation #2. The PAND gate already represents situation #1, and by reversing the order of its inputs, represents situation #3. By using just two temporal gates, we can succinctly represent the most fundamental temporal relation between two events: either they occur at the same time, or they do not. Furthermore, we can take the moment of time in question to be the moment at which an event first occurs. We ignore any duration it may or may not have and assume that once it is true it is persistent (i.e. remains true). This simplifies both the representation and the analysis, removes the need for any of the more complex Allen operators (such as 'overlaps'), and avoids the problems that plague the TAND. It also means that the definitions of the temporal gates are not dependent on any particular model of time (e.g. interval-or pointbased). Lastly, we limit ourselves to considering only single occurrences; repeating events are much harder to deal with, because they introduce the possibility of an event occurring both before and after another event. Since in FTA the events in question are mostly component faults, it seems reasonable to limit ourselves in this way because the only way faults can repeat is if they can be repaired, in which case every separate instance of a fault following a repair must be modelled as a separate event in the fault tree.
Having defined the nature of our gates in general terms, it is time to describe them in terms of their temporal logic. Firstly, the SAND gate. The SAND gate is a subset of the standard Boolean AND gate, and he requirement for this 'temporal AND gate' was also identified by Wijayarathna et al. during the development of the TAND gate. Here, it represents one of the three fundamental temporal relations.
Name: Simultaneous-AND gate Symbol:
B occurs at the same time as A occurs. Both A and B must occur.
The other gate is the Priority-AND gate. The PAND gate is designed to show the order in which events occur, but unlike the TAND gate, there is no notion of duration with the Priority-AND. The PAND gate's only purpose is to show the sequence of events, regardless of whether they occur immediately after one another or whether they occur years apart. The ability to define a meaningful relative temporal relationship between two events without reference to the undefined time interval between those events is the greatest strength of the PAND gate, but also perhaps the main reason why the gate has hitherto not been thoroughly defined. Since we already have '&' to represent the situation where A occurs at the same time as B, we can further define '<' and '>' so that A < B means A occurs before B and A > B means A occurs after B. This simple temporal notation is both intuitive and concise.
Name: Priority-AND gate Symbol:
B occurs at some point in time after A has occurred. Both must occur, but not at the same time.
With these definitions, it is possible to see how the two gates work with the existing Boolean logic. Assuming A AND B is true, then either A must have occurred at the same time as B, A was after B, or A was before B. The two temporal gates cover all three of these possibilities, and thus allow us to represent any possible temporal relation. However, if these gates are to be used for qualitative analysis, we need to have ways of logically reducing them.
TEMPORAL ANALYSIS
In order to perform logical reduction on the PAND gate, we need some laws to apply. Classical laws of reduction applied to Boolean logic still apply in many cases if an AND operator is substituted for a PAND or a SAND. For example, if a cut set is contained in a cut sequence, then the cut sequence is redundant (e.g. A+A<B=A). Similarly, a duplicated cut sequence is redundant (A<B+A<B=A<B). There are notable exceptions, however. For example, in classical logic, a duplicated event in a cut set can be ignored (i.e. A.A=A). This reduction is not always applicable in cut sequences. More importantly, there are some additional temporal laws that can be applied. The first such law is derived from our definition of time as described above, which means that only one temporal relationship is true at any one time:
The above is called the Law of Mutual Exclusion. It simply states that it is not possible for both X to occur before Y and for Y to occur before X, or for X to occur both before and at the same time as Y. If these situations occur, the whole branch is redundant. The second temporal law comes from the Idempotent Law:
Though less obvious than Mutual Exclusion, this is still quite clear, because it is part of the very definition of the PAND gate: an event cannot occur before itself. Therefore, X<X is always false. This is called the Law of Simultaneity. The third law shows how an AND gate relates to temporal gates:
This is the Law of Completion, and connects the temporal operators to the existing Boolean ones. The normal Boolean laws (distributive, absorption etc) are still satisfied when AND is substituted by temporal gates according to the Law of Completion; however, there is insufficient space to demonstrate it here. The fourth law relates to a PAND gate with more than one input, and also shows how multiple PAND gates can be combined into one:
X<Y<Z = (X<Y).(Y<Z).(X<Z)
This is named the Law of Extension, and it has several important consequences. Firstly, it shows how multiple-input PAND gates can be combined / expanded. It also shows that if we have two PAND gates, X<Y and Y<Z, which are connected by an AND gate, they can legitimately be combined into the multiple PAND X<Y<Z, because there is an implicit third term, X<Z. Logically, this is quite clear: if X is before Y, and Y is before Z, then X must also come before Z. This fact is very important in detecting cyclic redundancies. It also means that X<Y and X<Z cannot be combined into X<Y<Z unless the third term Y<Z is also present, because the temporal relation between Y and Z is not apparent. A cyclic redundancy is the trickiest temporal redundancy to detect, and it only occurs when multiple PAND gates are combined by an AND. Consider three PAND gates, X<Y, Y<Z, and Z<X, all combined with an AND gate. A moment's thought shows that this combination is impossible, because each event must occur before every other event.
Now that we have some temporal laws, we can begin to think about how to go about reducing temporal fault trees. We can already obtain the logical cut sets from the fault tree, but this does not help reduce the temporal cut sets, known as cut sequences. A temporal cut set contains temporal gates, and possibly standard AND gates as well. It is possible, then, that these cut sequences may in fact be redundant due to some temporal law. Unfortunately, we cannot necessarily perform reduction on a cut sequence in the way we could do if it was purely Boolean; there are two major problems to be overcome first.
Firstly, the presence of a PAND gate in a cut set means that at least some part of the cut set is in a fixed order (hence 'cut sequence'), and cannot be rearranged. Whereas the cut set X.Y.Z is logically the same as Z.Y.X, the cut sequence X<Y<Z is most certainly not the same as Z<Y<X. Thus the order of a cut sequence must be maintained by any reduction technique if it is to retain its meaning.
Secondly, the heterogeneity of operators in cut sequences effectively requires us to work directly with the fault tree during reduction rather than using the cut sets provided by standard techniques, such as MOCUS or BDDs, because they do not usually account for more than two types of gate. To reduce the fault tree correctly, we need to dramatically modify the algorithms in some way.
Working on the principle of 'divide and conquer', the analysis of a complex temporal expression can be simplified by the dividing it up in some way. However, because of the temporal relations, there are implicit links between the various events in the expression that must be taken into account during the analysis. The simplest way of dealing with this issue is to break the expression up into fundamental units, each of which preserves a single temporal relation. However, breaking up a temporal expression is not a simple matter, because we must somehow contrive to preserve the order of the events, the precedence of the operators, and the temporal significance of the events -not a trivial task.
To address this problem, we propose the concept of a 'doublet'. A doublet is an atomic structure that encapsulates a temporal relation between exactly two events. Doublets can contain either PAND and SAND, but they must always contain only two events and one operator. Doublets were conceived as the solution to the problems of temporal significance and operator precedence in situations where preliminary qualitative analysis has already taken place to produce cut sets. The idea is that a doublet holds all of the temporal information for its two events. The order between the two events is preserved, the temporal significance is contained, and the operator precedence issue is now removed because the doublet hides the temporal operator inside itself. Because the doublet is treated as a single atomic unit, it can be moved around, reordered, and reduced just as any other event can. A doublet is simply represented by two events contained within square brackets, which removes any confusion.
EXAMPLE
It is much easier to understand the doublet analysis process with an example . Fig 2 shows a system with two standby components. I is the system input, and component D delivers the system output. This is initially the output of A, and there is no output from B or C. Sensor 1 (S1) detects an omission of output from A (let us call it O-A) and starts B. D now delivers the output of B. S2 detects any omission of B (Odet-B), assuming B has started, and starts C. D now delivers the output of C. D fails silent (by omission) when there is omission of all outputs from A, B, C. This is caused when there is an omission of A that is not detected, in which case it is followed by an undetectable omission of B (Ound-B), or because there was a detectable omission of B followed by an omission at C. The HiP-HOPS tool works by annotating components with failure expressions that link internal failures and input deviations of components to their output deviations. As such, the failure expressions for components of this system are as follows:
To explain, on the left of the expression is an output event, e.g. Ound-B is an undetectable omission of component B and Odet-B is a detectable omission of B. On the right of the expression is a combination of basic events (e.g. 'C', failure of component C) and input deviations (e.g. O-I, omission of system input) joined by logical and temporal operators. HiP-HOPS uses these expressions to propagate failures through the system and so synthesise system fault trees. The fault tree produced by this example is too big to show in the space provided. However, to illustrate the application of doublet analysis in the analysis of this fault tree, some particularly interesting parts of the process will be detailed below. To begin with, let us look at Ound-B, to see how doublets are formed. Breaking these into doublets, we get: By looking at this set of 12 doublets, some of them can be eliminated immediately. The Law of Simultaneity says that [O-I<O-I] is impossible, and that [O-I&O-I] To see a more complex illustration, we need another example, such as the failure expressions of O-S2:
O-S2 = S2<Odet-B + S2&Odet-B = S2<(StartB-S1<B + StartB-S1<O-I) + S2&(StartB-S1<B + StartB-S1<O-I) = S2< ( where S2 is a failure of Sensor 2. The doublets produced from these expressions are as follows: Because we only know that both A and S2 must occur before B, the exact temporal relationship between A and S2 is unclear. The value of using doublets is that when converting the expressions to doublets, these types of subtle temporal semantics are revealed.
The final results of the analysis are as follows: Using doublet analysis, the fault tree has been reduced to just eleven minimal cut sequences, all of which are relatively simple to understand and draw conclusions from. Where a generic, non-temporal cut set like A.B.C might have been produced before, we now have much more precise expressions which highlight the importance of the event orders. For example, from our list of cut sequences, we can see that if B fails either before or at the same time as A, then the system will fail, regardless of the status of C. This would not have been represented had we not used temporal gates, and so we find that our triple redundancy system is not triple redundant if it fails in a certain order. We can also see that the sensors are very important, particularly Sensor 1 -if it fails before A, component B won't get a chance to activate, and our two redundant components never even get used. In this way, it is possible to see how using PAND and SAND gates to conduct temporal analysis has yielded a much richer understanding of the failure behaviour of the system.
CONCLUSIONS & FURTHER RESEARCH
In this paper, we have described a new method of performing temporal analysis on fault trees. The technique is applicable to both manual FTA and automated FTA. By extending standard fault tree analysis with two new temporal gates, a redefined Priority-AND gate and a Simultaneous-AND gate, it is possible to represent the failure conditions of a system much more precisely. We can therefore obtain more accurate results from the analysis of systems in which time plays an important factor, improving our insight into the potential faults of those systems. These additions are intended to be in keeping with the simple yet flexible philosophy of FTA, and so are not linked to any particular representation of time.
In addition, we have presented a method of analysing these new gates qualitatively and shown how it can produce useful results for an example system. Doublet analysis can be performed either automatically or manually. By using doublets, it is possible to combine the process with the fault tree synthesis algorithms of HiP-HOPS, where the benefits of a more precise analysis can be combined with the benefits of automation and potential reuse of component failure models. The concept of temporal analysis is particularly useful when applied to programmable systems and software, where event ordering is important for the correct operation of complex control algorithms. It is envisaged that the work detailed in this paper will be continued to produce a more rigorous algorithm for both quantitative and qualitative analysis of temporal gates, with a particular eye towards how to automate it efficiently so that it matches the performance and effectiveness of existing non-temporal FTA techniques. Furthermore, in collaboration with ENS Cachan (Roussel, et al, 2004) , we are also currently working towards formalising the concepts presented in this paper, aiming at the specification of an algebra for the description and analysis of temporal fault trees.
